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An Enduring Influence on Imperial Defence and Grand Strategy: British 
Perceptions of the Italian Navy, 1935-1943 
 
 
The Mediterranean Sea was a vital artery in the British imperial system, the 
importance of which grew rapidly after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. By 
linking the homeland to the prized possessions of the Far East; India, Ceylon and 
Singapore, and to the Australasian dominions, control of the Mediterranean and the 
security of its sea lanes were essential to the free flow of men and goods between the 
homeland and these distant stations, as well as the sending of military forces to 
protect them. Within the region itself, vital natural resources from the Middle East 
could also be returned to Britain. Consequently, regional powers bordering the 
Mediterranean have long held an important role in British imperial strategy and 
foreign policy. Of those European states with access to that sea, Italy was one of the 
most significant. Prior to unification, Piedmont was viewed as an important strategic 
buffer between France and Austria, which prevented either from dominating the 
central Mediterranean. The existence of a unified, stable and friendly state to act as a 
counterweight to France was a major contributing factor to subsequent British support 
for the “Risorgimento”.1 In the 19th Century, French naval concentrations in the 
region, and their conceptual development of the Jeune Ecole threatened Britain's vital 
“strategic corridor”. Concerns over this and the threat from Russia led to the 1887 
Mediterranean Agreement between Britain, Italy and Austria-Hungary, wherein Italy 
again played a stabilising role.2 It was to play a similar part in British strategy after 
entering the First World War, being charged with containing the Austro-Hungarian 
Navy and safeguarding maritime communications. Relations remained broadly cordial 
after the rise of Fascism. Barring occasional diplomatic incidents and some 
competition in the Middle East, the first dozen years of Mussolini's regime had been 
marked by general harmony and cooperation.3 In 1933, while beset by financial 
constraints, the British Cabinet had gone so far as to categorise Italy alongside France 
and America as a friendly power against whom no significant defence preparations 
were required.4  
The benevolence with which Italy had been viewed made Italian agitation over 
Abyssinia in 1935 come as something of a shock to the British, causing a step-change 
in Anglo-Italian relations. Whilst London was well aware that Mussolini had further 
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imperialist designs in Africa, it was thought that these could be managed through 
diplomacy. British representatives had made their opposition to any Italian aggression 
clear both at the Stresa Conference and to the Italian ambassador.5 Despite these 
warnings, the Italians invaded their fellow member of the League of Nations, the last 
independent African state, on 3 October 1935. As Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey 
was to note in early 1936, “...strained relations or war with Italy were the last thing 
anyone expected.”6 This increasingly aggressive expansionism began a period of 
almost ceaseless tension between Britain and Italy, which saw genuine potential for 
direct conflict from 1935-40, followed by outright war from 1940-43. As Robert 
Mallet has demonstrated, the Italian Navy – or Regia Marina Italiana (RMI) - was 
central to these imperialist ambitions and to Italian efforts to project power across the 
Mediterranean.7 Without it, Italy would have been unable to build an overseas empire, 
let alone maintain one. The primarily maritime lines of communication between 
Rome and its erstwhile imperial possessions meant that, in any future conflict, events 
at sea would be pivotal in deciding the outcome.  
The RMI thus formed an important influence on British imperial defence 
policy and war planning in the late 1930s, drawing in naval resources Britain would 
often have preferred to allocate closer to home or in the Far East. It was during the 
Second World War that makers of British strategic policy most completely saw the 
empire as an inter-connected entity, and strived for a centralised co-ordination of 
imperial resources.8 The RMI, however, constrained Britain's ability to send precious 
resources through the Mediterranean to defend her empire in the Far East and 
threatened positions in the Middle East and North Africa. In spite of its importance, 
there has been no dedicated study of British perceptions of the RMI from the first 
direct Italian aggression in 1935 through to the armistice of 1943.9 Instead, the 
existing literature is segmented; focusing on the distinct periods of the Abyssinian 
crisis and the Second World War, with some limited coverage of the intervening 
period.  
This article addresses this lacuna by delivering the first comprehensive 
assessment of British views of Italian naval power from the Abyssinian crisis through 
to the Second World War. It demonstrates that pre-war appreciations consistently (and 
incorrectly) viewed the Italian Air Force (Regia Aeronautica Italiana or RAI) and 
submarine service as significant threats, but that these changed dramatically after the 
declaration of war and early experiences of combat. By contrast, there was in fact a 
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remarkable degree of continuity in perceptions of the RMI throughout the whole 
period, which were broadly consistent across the Cabinet, Foreign Office, Chiefs of 
Staff (COS), Admiralty and Royal Navy (RN). The RMI was always viewed as vastly 
inferior to the RN, but as a force capable of inflicting sufficient damage to seriously 
hamper British ability to deliver imperial defence across the globe, or to conduct a 
world war against multiple nations across multiple theatres. This view persisted even 
after important defeats were inflicted on it in 1940-41, and it continued to influence 
British strategy and operations and tie down resources right through to the invasion of 
Sicily in July 1943. This article advances our understanding of British imperial 
defence, grand strategy and decision making before and during the Second World 
War, as well as their conduct of wartime operations, by demonstrating the influence 
their perceptions of the RMI had on them.  
Scholarship on the Abyssinian Crisis has been largely focused on issues of 
international diplomacy, collective security and the League of Nations. However, 
Arthur Marder has covered the position and role of the RN during the crisis, providing 
analysis of British perceptions of the RMI and the influence these assessments had on 
British strategic and operational thinking.10 This has received expansion from Steven 
Morewood, who offers a counter-factual assessment of the course of any direct 
Anglo-Italian conflict over Abyssinia, based on analysis of British perceptions of the 
RMI in both qualitative and quantitative terms.11 Both authors emphasise persuasively 
how the RN expected to triumph with ease should war occur. For the period from the 
end of the crisis through to the start of the Second World War, Lawrence Pratt’s 
seminal study of British strategic policy in the Mediterranean contains material on 
perceptions of the Italian armed forces, and especially the RMI.12 Yet Pratt offers 
limited examination as to whether there is a link between these perceptions and 
British actions. Similarly, two studies of pre-war naval planning do not assess the 
issue of perceptions and their influence. Reynolds M. Salerno places British, French 
and Italian naval planning within the context of the origins of the Second World War, 
but offers little on how they viewed each other.13 Christopher M. Bell has analysed 
the use of sea power in British plans for war with Italy during the 1935-39 period, but 
its focus on the evolution of strategy and war planning does not incorporate how the 
Admiralty, RN or Cabinet viewed their potential adversary.14 Finally, Morewood’s 
work on British plans for the defence of Egypt and the Suez Canal includes references 
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to their perceptions of the RMI and their influence, but focused specifically within 
this discrete area of imperial defence.15 
The historiography relating to Britain and Italy in the Second World War has 
focused rather heavily on the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean and debates 
over military effectiveness of the RMI.16 These rarely touch on what the British 
thought, even though this is vital to understanding their decision making. Several play 
to a concept that British perceptions were utterly dismissive, and this is epitomized by 
Samuel Eliot Morison, who infamously claimed that in 1942 “There was also the 
Italian Navy to guard against, on paper; but the ‘Dago Navy’ had long been regarded 
by British Tars as a huge joke”.17 Stephen Roskill does make reference to influence, 
stating that while militarily ineffective, the RMI still tied down British resources.18 
Yet how and why it did so is hardly explored within the multi-volume narrative, and 
Roskill's later work makes no such similar claim. Other series of the British official 
histories also leave the issue of perception underexplored.19 Elsewhere, authors have 
claimed the RMI conceded “moral ascendancy” to the RN and influence ceased after 
the losses at Taranto and Cape Matapan.20 As a rare exception, Angelo Caravaggio 
has stressed continued RMI influence after Taranto, but uses only published sources 
and sticks to specifically RN perceptions, rather than including views from Whitehall, 
and thus influence at the grand strategic level.21 These oversights in the 
historiography have obscured the manner in which perceptions of the RMI helped to 
shape the evolution of British grand strategy from the pre-war period through to the 
Second World War.  
 
The Abyssinian Crisis 
 
The first time the possibility of war with Italy was really considered at the Cabinet 
level was in July 1935. Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin asked the COS for an 
appreciation of the military implications of applying economic pressure to Italy 
through sanctions.22 The Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), Admiral Chatfield, 
considered that exercising economic pressure on the Italians might lead them to 
“commit an act of war” against British forces or imperial possessions - a so-called 
“mad dog” act. Chatfield cautioned that “It would put us in a position of grave 
disadvantage if we postponed the necessary preparations for war until the moment 
when it had been decided to commence the exercise of pressure.”23 The COS and 
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Hankey concluded the meeting in agreement on this point, and that full preparation 
for war should be made, including efforts to secure the cooperation of France. A 
subsequent report by the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) further reinforced this 
thesis.24 
At the next COS meeting in August, Chatfield reiterated that the 
Mediterranean Fleet strength was inadequate for the tasks it may have to carry out as 
a deterrent or in the event of war. It would have to be reinforced, while the Home 
Fleet would need to be sent to Gibraltar in the event of hostilities.25 This concern was 
shared in the Foreign Office. The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
Robert Vansittart told his superior, Samuel Hoare, that “...the Mediterranean Fleet is 
probably at present too weak to look after itself vis-à-vis Italy, and if any serious 
trouble were possible it would have to be reinforced.” After the collapse of the Anglo-
French-Italian conference in Paris shortly afterwards, he repeated the argument to 
Anthony Eden; “…you are faced with a first-class international crisis. We have got to 
reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet.”26 Reflecting on the COS meeting that had 
recommended reinforcing the Mediterranean, Chatfield confessed to Vansittart that 
“...it would be a dangerous prospect for us to go to war with Italy with the British 
Fleet unmobilised [sic].”27 The Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Mediterranean 
Fleet, Admiral W.W. Fisher, agreed. He consistently urged London to send all 
available reinforcements and suggested the Home Fleet should be based at Malta. He 
went on to say that any hostile act by Italy should be met by an immediate, powerful 
counteroffensive, but conceded it would have to await the juncture of the two fleets 
for decisive superiority.28  
It was clear to all that the Mediterranean Fleet would have to be reinforced due 
to the possibility of combat with the RMI. The debate was over how much to 
reinforce it, and it spilled beyond the Cabinet, COS and RN. An out of favour 
Winston Churchill waded in from his home in Chartwell, claiming that the 
Mediterranean Fleet “...is on paper - that is all we are justified in going by - far 
weaker than the Italian Navy”, and expressed particular concerns over Italian 
superiority in modern cruisers, destroyers and submarines. He received an assurance 
from Hoare in reply that his comments were being discussed, and they certainly 
echoed the concerns of many in the government and armed forces at that time.29 
Later that month, the Cabinet concluded that the Mediterranean Fleet should 
be reinforced by such forces that the Admiralty “deemed desirable”, and that the 
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Home Fleet should be readied to sail to Gibraltar if the Italians did not back down.30 
An aircraft carrier, two flotillas of destroyers and one of submarines were released 
from the Home Fleet, but the bulk of it remained on readiness at Portland to sail at a 
later date. The RN would also not be fully mobilised. The difficulty was striking a 
balance between having a sufficiently strong force to deter Italian action or easily 
defeat the RMI, but not to send so much that it might precipitate Italian action. As 
Chatfield cautioned Fisher:  
 “The Cabinet wanted me to send you at once all the reinforcements I had 
 envisaged...It was their view that to send out everything and the Home Fleet 
 to Gibraltar would act as a deterrent to Mussolini but I had to point out the 
 danger if they proved incorrect as the Foreign Office so often are.” 
He concluded by stating that heavy reinforcement could have the effect of “touching 
off the excitable Iti” and plunging Britain into war in unfavourable circumstances. He 
thus opposed the sending of battle cruisers despite a clear need for them on similar 
grounds.31  
Chatfield’s concern over the possibility of a “mad dog” act were 
understandable given the signs coming from Rome, where the British ambassador, 
Eric Drummond, warned of such a possibility throughout the summer. He suggested 
in late August that the likelihood had significantly increased. Britain suffered from a 
paucity of multi-source intelligence on Italian intentions and capabilities at this stage, 
and so lacked the means to challenge such assumptions.32 Yet Chatfield's response to 
Fisher should not be taken to suggest that he, the other COS or members of the 
Cabinet, felt that the final result of a war with Italy would ever be in doubt. The 
feeling among them was that if war came, triumph over the RMI was practically 
guaranteed. Chatfield was confident that “...if Italy is mad enough to challenge 
us...she will be defeated”.33 As he told his fellow COS, it was doubtful that the RMI 
“would ever really prove efficient at sea.”34 This belief was widely held within the 
service. Fisher expected to be able to “blow the Italians out of the water with the 
ordinary Mediterranean Fleet.”35 Roger Backhouse, C-in-C of the Home Fleet, 
thought a “strong beginning” against the RMI would break the fragile morale present 
in a “Latin race.” Similar sentiments were expressed by other RN officers.36 
The primary threat to the RN was considered to come from the air. Italy was 
known to have been increasing its expenditure on the RAI and expanding it, 
particularly in terms of bomber forces. By 1935, the majority of these were based in 
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Sicily, Southern Italy and Libya, within easy striking distance of Malta.37 Malta, and 
especially the Mediterranean Fleet if it was anchored there, was expected to be the 
first target of any Italian aggression. This attack was expected to be delivered through 
air power, and likely air power alone.38 Naval bombardment by the RMI was broadly 
dismissed as improbable by the COS and the JPC, with only Backhouse suggesting it 
could occur had advantageous circumstances presented themselves to the RMI. An 
attempt at an amphibious landing was viewed as even less likely.39 Such appreciations 
were indeed highly accurate, as although Mussolini had instructed the head of the 
RMI to develop plans for an attack on Malta, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari viewed it 
as both unnecessary and highly unlikely to deliver long-term success. He suggested 
instead focusing on opportunistic attacks in the Sicilian Channel, particularly using 
submarines, light forces and aircraft.40 This was to be very similar to his 
recommendation in 1939-40. 
The question of the air threat to Malta and the RN fits in with the broader 
simultaneous “bombs vs. battleships” debate.41 Warships were viewed as particularly 
vulnerable to air power in the Mediterranean due its enclosed nature and the position 
of mainland and island bases giving comparatively easy coverage for long range 
aircraft. Influential voices were arguing that air power had rendered the central 
Mediterranean untenable for British merchant shipping and warships. Basil Liddell-
Hart had claimed that shipping would have to be re-routed around the “Cape route” 
south of the African continent in 1925.42 A Royal United Services Institute gold 
medal winning essay articulated something very similar in 1935, claiming “If the 
British fleet could be threatened with such damage that it would be forced to 
withdraw from the Mediterranean, or it could be denied the use of its bases, control or 
partial control of a section of the Mediterranean route might pass to the hostile 
power.”43 The view was pervasive. A lengthy joint report by the Admiralty and Board 
of Trade recommended that in the event of war with Italy, all trade should be diverted 
via the cape due primarily to the threat of air power and submarines. The Defence 
Policy and Requirements Committee of the CID approved this position in 
September.44 
Malta was acknowledged to be a vital fleet base in the event of war with Italy 
thanks to its central location and extensive dockyard facilities.  In spite of these facts, 
the decision was taken to withdraw the Mediterranean Fleet due to the threat of the 
RAI, and it sailed for Alexandria on 29 August. The island would still be defended, 
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but would only house aircraft for doing so - the fleet could only contribute remotely 
from an unfavourable position in Egypt. The proposal for an alternative fleet base at 
Navarino on the Greek Adriatic coast (codenamed “Port X”) was also suspended 
indefinitely due to being within easy reach of the RAI.45 The perceived RAI threat 
was exacerbated by faulty intelligence assumptions. These inflated Italian accuracy in 
port bombing, and the anti-shipping capabilities of the new SM. 81 bomber, which 
actually suffered from serious technical problems and lacked armour-piercing 
bombs.46 There were also overestimations of the training and will of the RAI 
aircrews, with Drummond even rather gullibly giving credence to the rumour of a 
crack “suicide squadron” of up to 200 volunteers, who were ready to make kamikaze-
style attacks on the RN and perhaps London!47 British financial stringency since 1918 
had forced them to abandon widespread human intelligence gathering in Italy long 
before this point. Signals intelligence was unable to add much clarity at this stage 
either, as the RAI’s high-grade cypher was not broken until 1938. As such, there was 
no robust network through which to challenge these assumptions, which would later 
prove vastly over-inflated.48 
Nevertheless, the RMI threat was not discarded, and it was seen as key that 
RN deployments in the theatre were kept at a high level in order to act as an effective 
deterrent. Backhouse warned that if the Italians realised that the RN, having left 
Malta, was concentrated fully in the eastern Mediterranean, they might use the RMI to 
bombard targets in the Western basin or attack trade there. He strongly urged the 
stationing of battle cruisers at Gibraltar, suggesting that even one could have a 
“steadying effect” on the Italy.49 A major detachment of the Home Fleet was sent 
there a week later, including the capital ships Hood and Renown.50 By late September, 
the RN commitment across the theatre was huge, dwarfing the RMI in terms of capital 
ships (5:2 in battleships and 2:0 in battle cruisers) and carriers (2:0).51 Even then, 
concerns were expressed over basing issues, insufficient destroyers and the Italian 
submarine menace, but Hoare assured the Cabinet that the large-scale deployment had 
rendered the possibility of Italian attacks on British interests much reduced.52  
The perceived need for numerical superiority over the RMI and for a swift 
victory in the event of conflict persisted after the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 
October. When the French Foreign Minister seemed to suggest that RN deployment 
was too extensive, the British ambassador assured him that “…present British naval 
strength in the Mediterranean could be trusted to deal with any ‘mad dog’ act” but any 
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significant reduction could lead the “…Italian Government to think they could attack 
us, if not with impunity, at least with the possibility of inflicting serious losses”. The 
ambassador was clear in his message that reductions in RN strength could make an 
Italian attack more likely, and thus increase the likelihood of French involvement.53  
When Italy also raised the possibility of some British capital ships being 
withdrawn in order to encourage detente, it was discussed regularly in the Cabinet 
over October and early November. After the government agreed that the withdrawal 
of two battle cruisers would be possible in return for a marked reform of rhetoric from 
the Italian press and large troop reductions in Libya, Chatfield responded robustly. 
The proposition of weakening the RN commitment was unacceptable; the most he 
could offer was to detach ships from the Home Fleet at Gibraltar to send home for 
refits and delayed leave for personnel.54 The notion collapsed. By December, the 
Cabinet felt obliged to veto the compromise of withdrawing two battleships from the 
eastern basin for required refit and replacing them with a battle cruiser. Numbers were 
required, and despite the need for refits and personnel changes, a more suitable time 
would have to be awaited.55  
Despite concern over a possible “mad dog” act having been on the wane over 
early 1936, the RN commitment in the Mediterranean remained. The First Lord of the 
Admiralty spoke at length before the Cabinet of the exceptional strain that had been 
placed on the RN to sustain such a high level of commitment without full mobilisation 
and that “We could not afford to overlook Japan”.56 Yet it was only in March 1936 
that agreement was reached in the Cabinet for the withdrawal of a single capital ship, 
the discussion of which brought protests from men on the spot. In his response to 
Backhouse, Chatfield explained that he did not like weakening the forces in the 
theatre, but that the manning situation was critical, and this was the least risky time at 
which to make the move.57  
By this time, dangers elsewhere were also increasing. Continued Japanese 
aggression over Manchuria and the German reoccupation of the Rhineland were 
forcing the British to reconsider their Mediterranean commitments once again. A 
series of Italian victories in Abyssinia were also making it clear that the end of the 
war was approaching, while the League continued to debate and postpone decisions 
over oil sanctions. The war effectively ended with the flight of Emperor Haile 
Selassie and the fall of Addis Ababa in early May. The crisis was essentially over, 
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with sanctions ending in July, the withdrawal of large quantities of Anglo-French 
naval forces and the return of the Mediterranean Fleet to Malta.  
It is clear that the British did not entertain any possibility of defeat in the event 
of war with Italy, even if they had to fight alone and from a disadvantageous position. 
However, while there were potential advantages to a war that ended in swift victory, it 
was ultimately something to be avoided for two primary reasons. First, there was the 
risk of driving Italy and Germany closer together, with the subsequent multi-fronted 
danger to the empire. This in turn could provide further opportunities for an 
expansionist Japan. It was a situation which available intelligence suggested the 
Italians appreciated.58 Second, and interlinked, was that although fighting a losing 
cause, the Italians would still likely inflict some losses through both air and sea 
power. Losses or serious damage to major units of the RN would be particularly 
hurtful to Britain's global imperial position. Germany and Japan were increasingly 
hostile powers, and such losses would hamper the ability to defend the homeland, 
imperial possessions and communications both at home and in the Far East. For the 
latter, this included the Admiralty’s “Singapore Strategy” – a plan to send a fleet 
through the Mediterranean to defend the naval base there again Japanese aggression.59 
As Vansittart aptly summarised; “...we must never forget surely that we now have no 
naval margin at all, and the loss of one or two ships even would be a very serious 
matter for us.”60 The CID reached the same conclusion, warning;  
 “If the fleet is involved in active operations...it must be expected that losses 
 will ensue...There is bound to be a danger, therefore, that the results of a war 
 with Italy would be to leave the British fleet temporarily weakened to such an 
 extent as to be able to fulfil its worldwide responsibilities.”61 
It was for this reason that the CID recommended taking all possible actions to be 
prepared for war, but also to avoid it. 
Evidently, the British perceived the RMI as a markedly inferior force in all 
senses, and less of a threat to the RN than the RAI or Italian submarines. Yet they felt 
it still retained the potential to inflict very unwelcome losses. While there were subtle 
differences, these perceptions were broadly consistent across key governmental 
decision makers and military personnel. This view persisted even after massive 
reinforcement of the Mediterranean gave the RN major superiority. Chatfield noted in 
September, “It is a war which, if it takes place, there could be no doubt as to its end; 
we shall have many losses in ships and men, thereby our world position as a naval 
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power will be weakened.”62 Any losses incurred would be very unlikely to affect the 
outcome of an Anglo-Italian war, but they would greatly hamper Britain's ability to 
provide global imperial defence and power projection with an already overstretched 
navy. Several Cabinet sub-committees repeatedly postulated that a great increase in 
naval construction would be required if war were to occur, so as to replace these 
losses and allow wider imperial defence to continue effectively.63 Such construction 
would of course take time, and this issue was critical in the face of an increasingly 
hostile Germany and Japan, who could well seize any opportunity presented by a 
weakened RN. As such, British perceptions of the RMI represented one of several 
factors that dictated inaction and appeasement over Abyssinia. These perceptions 
were to remain largely unchanged after the crisis had abated. 
 
Appeasement, War Planning and the Approach of War, 1936-1939 
 
As the Abyssinian Crisis abated, the COS urged the Cabinet to pursue detente with 
Italy even more vigorously. Central to this argument was the need to provide security 
in the Far East:  
 “... it is of paramount importance to British strategical interests that we should 
 be free from commitments in the Mediterranean if our defence arrangements 
 are to prove adequate to deal with a threat of hostilities in the Far East or at 
 Home and to give us breathing space in which to recondition the services. It 
 is evident that  to achieve this we must return as soon as possible to a state of 
 friendly relations with Italy”.  
This strategic outlook was one of the key factors underpinning British acquiescence in 
the ending of sanctions on Italy, and later recognition of their annexation of 
Abyssinia.64 
Over most of 1936-38, the British government pursued a policy of 
appeasement towards Italy, consistently attempting to reduce Anglo-Italian tension 
despite increasing Italian military involvement in the Spanish Civil War. This policy 
was exemplified by the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian Agreements of 1937 and 
1938.65 It was only the Italian invasion of Albania, which “irrevocably” committed 
Italy to the Axis, and shattered any remaining notions (such as that held by 
Chamberlain) that Mussolini could be a partner in the maintenance of peace. If this 
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needed any further confirmation, it came with the signing of the Pact of Steel the next 
month.66  
This seemingly weak diplomacy from the British was underpinned by the 
same dilemmas of imperial defence and naval overstretch as during the Abyssinian 
crisis. As Chatfield pointed out to the new C-in-C Mediterranean, Dudley Pound; if he 
was getting the impression that the British government was afraid of consolidating the 
Mediterranean position for fear of hurting Italian feelings, it would be incorrect. 
Instead:  
 “There are two points of view about the Italians which have to be considered. 
 The first is that they are thoroughly untrustworthy and probably little better 
 fighters than they used to be, are insolent and bombastic, and the best thing 
 would be to teach them a lesson and answer threat by threat; and the second is 
 that the Mediterranean position is only one of three anxieties (Germany and 
 Japan are the other two), and as we are hopelessly weak to meet the 
 responsibilities of all three services, and so long as we cannot come to terms 
 with either of our two chief opponents, it will be better in the long run to get 
 an agreement with Italy because we have no basic cause of enmity with that 
 country, as we have with the other two. I think this latter factor, together with 
 the unreadiness I have referred to, has really dominated the thoughts of the 
 CID.” 
It was a view Pound quickly came to appreciate.67 
As was the case during the Abyssinian Crisis, there was still consensus that in 
the event of war, the defeat of the RMI was practically guaranteed. Pound had gotten 
the chance to personally assess the RMI up close during their visit to Malta in August 
1938. He, along with his staff, were quick to conclude that it had not improved in 
terms of efficiency in operation and remained “second rate”.68 By the close of 1938, 
the British naval attaché in Rome was reporting that the RMI possessed a well-
balanced fleet which was aptly suited for Italian regional requirements, with efficient 
personnel at the petty officer level. Its modernized battleships, while notably inferior 
to the RN's Queen Elizabeth class, were still fast and powerful. New battleships under 
construction were likely to be much closer to a match for the RN, but were running 
behind schedule. Nevertheless, he reported that the Italian officers lacked confidence 
and that the RMI as a whole was a collection of “fair weather sailors”. They were 
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capable of acts of courage and individual brilliance, but were susceptible to a quick 
blow to morale.69 
The view that the RAI was the bigger threat remained, although the wild over-
assessments of capability that had crept through from some sources during the 
Abyssinian crisis seem to have ceased. Both the Cabinet, COS and RN commanders 
in theatre expressed concern over the possibility of the Italians creating a new base in 
the Balearics, but stressed that the danger would be from air power based there, not 
sea power, which could only really threaten the French.70 The COS believed in early 
1937 that Italy probably possessed the most up to date front line aircraft among the 
western powers at that stage, but lacked the industrial capacity to build up front line 
strength and reserves at the same time. Instead they would probably be forced to 
concentrate on the latter, thus reducing the front line threat. Similarly, the Foreign 
Office's Annual Embassy Report for 1937 highlighted the technical modernity of the 
RAI front line aircraft, but a slow projected speed of expansion due to a combination 
of industrial weakness and a lack of trained aircrew to man new construction. In a 
sentiment echoed by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) in 1939, it suggested that the 
RAI had a small cadre of highly trained pilots, and an “unpretentious majority” of 
more moderate skill.71  
After the hype about the extreme threat it represented in 1935-36, views had 
clearly softened. This was at least in part due to improved intelligence, as the RAI 
high-grade cypher was broken in 1938, while the Spanish Civil War offered an 
opportunity to observe them operating. By Christmas 1938, the air attaché in Rome 
was able to conclude that the RAI possessed the equipment, personnel and training to 
strike a series of powerful early blows, but lacked the depth for sustained operation; 
“Today, therefore, the Italian Air Force is in no position to enter a war of the first 
magnitude with any hope of pursuing it successfully once the initial blow has spent 
itself.”72 As in 1935-36, air power was perceived as the greatest threat to Malta. The 
debate over the threat, and the closing of the Mediterranean, continued. It was 
sufficiently serious that by 1939 the CID recommended some modification of the 
policy of absolute priority for the air defence of Great Britain in order to allow 
provision of AA guns, equipment and RDF to Malta, along with Gibraltar and 
Alexandria to a lesser extent.73 
By the time of the Munich crisis, the issue of potential British naval 
commitments being stretched beyond breaking point was reaching a new peak. The 
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First Lord informed his Cabinet colleagues that the crisis could not have come “...at a 
time less desirable from the naval point of view.” The period from summer 1937 to 
spring 1939 had been identified as a period of particular vulnerability in terms of 
capital ships - no new vessels would come into service during this period, while three 
of the older ones were undergoing extensive repair. Two others were out of action for 
shorter periods for minor refits and rearming. The situation forced the withdrawal of 
additional forces from the Malta and the eastern Mediterranean to Gibraltar and 
Britain in order to meet the potential German threat.74 The RN simply did not have the 
capacity to face both the RMI and guarantee home security during this window of 
Axis opportunity. 
As it became increasingly clear that war with Italy was on the horizon, debate 
over how to conduct it in the maritime realm intensified. There were essentially two 
main schools: those who argued for a quick “knockout blow” against Italy that would 
allow for concentration on Germany afterwards, and those who favoured a slower 
method of economic strangulation by blockade.75 One of the biggest proponents of the 
knockout method was Admiral Drax, who had been drafted in to the planning process. 
One of his first contributions to the debate stressed that “…when dealing with a 
country so inferior to us in naval strength as Germany or Italy, there is every reason to 
start with a vigorous offensive.” He saw the elimination or negation of the RMI as 
key, and advocated its destruction at sea where possible, and the blockading of it in 
port for attack by air power where it was not. Key Italian ports, aerodromes and 
coastal facilities should also be bombarded by the RN, which would probably result in 
a collapse of Italian national morale.76  
It is significant to note, however, that even within his ultra-aggressive mantra, 
Drax allowed for potential problems that could be caused by the RMI. He was clear 
that in order to safeguard Malta, Britain and France would not just need at least air 
parity with Germany and Italy, but clear naval superiority in the Mediterranean. 
Forces designated to bombard the Italian mainland should also be sufficiently 
powerful in capital ships and cruisers to deal with significant RMI opposition as it 
would almost certainly sail in force in order to defend the mainland. Indeed, the 
question of quantitative superiority remained vital for offensive operations; Drax 
urged pre-emptive action in early 1939 while the Anglo-French advantage over the 
RMI’s two operational battleships was huge. His worry was that “By the end of 1939 
they may have 6, which would make the Mediterranean situation far more difficult.”77 
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Clearly, even for one of the biggest proponents of the knockout school, the RMI was a 
force that represented an extant threat, and should be dealt with properly in the most 
advantageous circumstances possible. 
The knockout school had a powerful champion in the form of a new First 
Lord; Winston Churchill. In a 1939 “Memorandum on Sea Power”, he proclaimed 
that in the event of war with Italy “England’s first battlefield is the Mediterranean.” 
Churchill was clear that a quick knockout could be achieved within two months, and 
that destruction of the RMI was a key facet of the strategy. He was uniquely bullish in 
that he dismissed the threat not just of the RMI, but also of their submarines and 
downplayed that of the RAI. Yet even Churchill, as the most dismissive voice 
regarding the RMI and the Italians in general, admitted the importance of the addition 
of the French fleet and bases to success in the Mediterranean.78 His views must also 
be seen within the context of his plans for war with Japan. A quick knockout blow 
would allow a powerful RN fleet to be sent to the Singapore, and curtail any Japanese 
hopes of advancing so far from their home bases.79 The addition of French forces in 
defeating the RMI would help prevent the latter from inflicting on losses on what 
would then become the Singapore fleet. 
For Pound, the greatest threat remained the RAI, followed by submarines, both 
of which had demonstrated some potential during the Spanish Civil War. He 
cautioned that “Italy will not fail to make use of her advantageous geographical 
position and of her strength in long range aircraft.” Air power still offered the greatest 
threat to Malta, and defences should be built up accordingly. The RAI posed a major 
threat to the RN at sea or in port, while some damage to the Mediterranean fleet from 
Italian submarines had to be expected, if only due to their sheer quantity. Yet while 
prioritising the other threats, Pound had clearly not discounted the RMI. He 
recommended the Mediterranean Fleet should have at the outset three battleships, a 
carrier, four heavy and four light cruisers in order to deal with an estimated two 
Italian battleships, four heavy and eight light 6in cruisers - a clear superiority in 
capital ships. He would also need 36 destroyers to balance Italian destroyer strength 
and provide other duties, while further capital ship and cruiser reinforcements should 
be sent when possible. The Admiralty agreed, indicating that the force, plus an 
additional light cruiser, would be in place by April 1939.80 A later signal from Pound 
also makes it clear that although he ranked the danger of the RMI as less than that of 
aircraft or submarines, the threat was still extant. This danger increased if the RMI 
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were to be used in conjunction with the other arms, and intimated in August that the 
situation would be greatly altered once the Italians could deploy six capital ships.81 
For the COS, the question of deterring the Italians from entering the war by a 
demonstration of naval strength, as they had acted in 1935, was an exceedingly 
difficult one. It was felt that the Italians would only be deterred if it was clearly 
obvious to them that defeat would result. The problem was, as Pound had conceded, 
that the danger of the RMI was magnified when placed in conjunction with the RAI 
and submarine fleet;  
 “While we could probably spare some capital ships from Home waters, we 
 cannot spare any destroyers, and this lack of destroyers is the governing factor 
 in any British naval reinforcements that could be sent to the Mediterranean. 
 The despatch of two or three battleships alone might be suitable as a deterrent 
 so long as Italy is neutral; but without destroyers they would be immobilised 
 in the event of war, and would be exposed to intensive submarine and air 
 attack without achieving any useful purpose. Their despatch might thus 
 conceivably have the reverse effect to that intended.”  
In fact, the CAS had warned almost exactly a year earlier that the RAI posed a great 
threat to any RN warships utilised in bombardments off the Italian coast. Losses and 
damage inflicted by the RAI would leave a weakened RN that could then be attacked 
by the RMI. Interestingly, this concern reflects Italian naval planning against Britain 
(and with France neutralised) in summer 1940 very closely. They hoped in the event 
of war to avoid early direct major fleet action, first depleting the RN heavily through 
air, submarine and light force attack, then finally committing their fleet at opportune 
moments. The idea of a knockout blow against Italy was thus shelved, and 
perceptions of the RMI had played a part in this, even if it was only a supporting one 
to their fellow service.82 
For most of the period from 1936-40 British policy towards Italy was 
underpinned by appeasement, driven through the prism of the ongoing simultaneous 
threats from Germany and Japan.83 It is within this strategic context that British 
perceptions of the RMI sat. As had been the case during the Abyssinian crisis, they 
were governed by two main assumptions. The first was that the RMI was inferior to 
the RN, with lower quality warships and equipment, crews that were less well trained, 
and tactics that were poorly developed. The second was that despite its faults, it had 
the potential to cause losses or damage to major RN units just as the RAI and 
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submarine service did, and thus exacerbate the wider dilemma of imperial defence. 
Consequently, despite the perception of inferiority, the RMI should be engaged in 
favourable circumstances; ideally where it was greatly outnumbered and outgunned. 
Such a view was shared even by the most bullish advocates of the knockout school. 
This problem was more acute than it had been during the Abyssinian crisis, as 
the delay of important refits, overhauls and personnel changes that had been 
postponed then were forced to come together at once before important new warship 
construction was completed. The RMI also had its own re-modernized and new 
construction battleships approaching, which would triple its load of capital ships and 
bring serious qualitative advancement from the two new vessels. There were also 
continued difficulties in achieving Anglo-French consensus as to a joint 
Mediterranean strategy. By April and May 1940, both had greatly reinforced their sea 
power, but joint strategy was elusive. While the British now envisioned only a 
holding strategy, the latter wanted “a vigorous offensive in the first hours of war” 
against Italy.84 
Ultimately, British pre-war strategy anticipated the closure of the 
Mediterranean to general shipping, but the expectation was because of the danger 
from both the RAI and RMI.85 While the perceived threat of the RAI and the 
submarine fleet remained greater than that of the RMI, the former two had declined 
since the Abyssinian crisis in the face of improved British intelligence and 
observation of their actions in the Spanish Civil War, while the latter had remained 
constant. These comparative trajectories were to continue, and at a faster pace, once 
war became a reality. 
 
War 
 
The early stages of the Battle of France quickly made it clear that if Italy entered the 
war, Britain's key ally would likely not be available for long to assist in the 
Mediterranean. This was evidently in the Prime Minister's mind when he minuted the 
COS in late May;  
 “If France is still our ally after an Italian declaration of war, it would appear 
 extremely desirable that the combined fleets, operating from opposite ends of 
 the Mediterranean, should pursue an active offensive against Italy. It is 
 important that at the outset, collision should take place both with the Italian 
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 Navy and Air Force, in order that we can see what their quality really is, and 
 whether it has changed at all since the last war. The purely defensive strategy 
 contemplated by C-in-C Mediterranean ought not to be accepted unless it is 
 found that the fighting qualities of the Italians are high. It will be much better 
 that the fleet at Alexandria should sally forth and run some risks than it should 
 remain in a posture so markedly defensive.”  
Although couched in his usual belligerent manner, Churchill was evidently concerned 
that the loss of France would put the RMI on more of a level playing field. 
Cunningham's response was that he and his men were anxious to “get at” the RMI. 
His first move would be a powerful sortie into the central Mediterranean to guarantee 
the safety of Malta.86 This was indeed what he did on 11 June, shortly after the Italian 
declaration of war. 
The sortie failed to make contact with the RMI and Cunningham found this 
lack of engagement “profoundly unsatisfactory”. He remained determined to bring 
them to battle as a vital tenet of knocking Italy out of the war.87 Although the fall of 
France appeared imminent, the implications had only been discussed since late May. 
On 17 June, as the French requested an armistice, Pound circulated a revelatory 
suggestion put forward by the Admiralty's Director of Plans (DoP). It stated that with 
the loss of the French in the western basin, the eastern might be abandoned entirely, 
keeping the Fleet ensconced at Gibraltar instead. Revealingly, the reasons given for 
this included not just the threat of the RAI, but that there was also a need to have 
something substantial to stand between the RMI and the Atlantic. The proposal was 
soon quietly dropped, but these concerns contributed to the creation of Force H at 
Gibraltar and the attack on the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir.88  
It was not until July that the long awaited naval clash came, and it was to 
prove indecisive. The long range duel at Calabria saw no losses and scant damage to 
either side, but it was the Italians who disengaged first. This fact was pointed to by 
Cunningham in his belated report as evidence that they had gained “...a certain degree 
of moral ascendancy” over the Italians.89 For their part, several senior Admirals in the 
RMI seem to have come away from Calabria feeling that the result was equal, or even 
that they had the better of it. The commander of the fleet at sea, Admiral Campioni, 
was highly positive. Admiral Paladini went a step further, claiming that it 
demonstrated “... our ability to cope with and beat the enemy.”90 Cunningham's report 
conceded that he had opted against “playing the enemy’s own game” and pursuing 
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them through a smokescreen, fearing a trap.91  Nevertheless, he was able to report to 
Pound that while the engagement was frustrating, nothing “very dashing” should be 
expected from the RMI. His main concern remained, as it had been before war, the 
RAI. This view was further entrenched after a successful cruiser-level engagement off 
Cape Spada later that month.92  
The opening five months at sea were marked by frustration and minor 
successes, and perceptions of the RMI remained essentially unchanged. Meanwhile, 
concerns over the vaunted Italian submarine fleet had quickly proven to be misplaced. 
Rapid expansion over the late interwar years had left it with numerous technical and 
tactical problems, while a lack of establishments meant the quality of training had not 
yet caught up with the expanded personnel numbers.93 Despite a massive early 
deployment, with 49 vessels at sea on the opening night of war alone, they acted as 
little more than a paper tiger.94 An impressive early success in sinking the cruiser 
Calypso was overshadowed by far more numerous errors. With the aid of intelligence, 
nine were sunk, one captured and others damaged in the first month of war, 
sometimes being caught when committing the cardinal sin of running on the surface 
in daytime.95 This encouraged British views of poor training, which were reinforced 
by the capture of the Galileo Galilei in the Red Sea. Interrogation revealed that few of 
the crew had received specialised submarine training before being assigned, and 
levels of generalised training were low. They had received little opportunity to 
exercise at sea, having conducted just a single practice for gunnery and torpedo firing 
since arriving on station in February.96 
Poor training was exacerbated by tactical shortcomings and various technical 
problems across the different classes. A rigid tactical doctrine that was inflexibly 
administered hampered the ability of commanders to produce results, while technical 
problems led to a series of breakdowns in some classes.97 Early observations from 
British anti-submarine operations, captured vessels and intelligence had given the RN 
a good indication of this, but it was truly driven home by the capture of the Perla in 
June 1942. An investigation into the vessel reported that “The mechanical conditions 
in the boat were deplorable, and it is a mystery how the Italians succeeded in 
operating the ship”, listing a vast number of faults in key systems.98 Although 
numerous later tactical and technical developments, which led to limited 
improvement, British perceptions had been altered permanently. The Italian 
submarine fleet no longer caused notable concern. After a series of successes by 
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German U-boats shortly after arrival in autumn 1941, Somerville lamented to 
Cunningham “…we have had an easy time with the ‘Iti’ U-boats, but these Huns are a 
different proposition”.99  
Much as with the submarine force, the RAI threat quickly proved to be 
exaggerated. Fears of immediate massed bombing of Malta never materialised. 
Theoretically there were 1,569 frontline Italian bombers available as of 1 June 1940, 
but only 783 were actually serviceable and many were required elsewhere. Just 35 
were employed on the initial air raids and although this increased after the French 
armistice, many were soon transferred to other duties. After 10 months of war, the 
RAI had managed 103 operations against Malta with raids averaging just five aircraft 
in size. Their losses were significant, with 35 destroyed and over 200 damaged after 
six months.100 Raids over 1941-42 were much larger, more frequent and more 
accurate, with a much higher proportion of German aircraft than Italian. From early 
1941 onwards, British concerns over the island were all specifically related to 
German air power.101 
Much the same story played out regarding the RAI threat to the RN and 
shipping at sea. The first indication that the pre-war threat was exaggerated came 
when the RAI failed to even make an appearance during the first wartime sortie of the 
Mediterranean Fleet. This came as a shock to Cunningham, who noticed their general 
inactivity over the first month of war, other than the bombing of Malta. Even a joint 
Anglo-French bombardment of Bardia did not bring an RAI reaction.102 The first 
significant meeting with the RAI came at Calabria, when the Mediterranean Fleet was 
bombed intensively, but with only a single damaging hit to the cruiser Gloucester. In 
a clear demonstration of the poor state of Italian air-sea integration, they also bombed 
the withdrawing RMI heavily. While not the most convincing performance, it was 
enough to keep Cunningham wary of them.103 
By November, Cunningham noted for the first time Italian bombers jettisoning 
their payloads and withdrawing rather than attacking the RN, if engaged by fighters. 
He would later see this as a propensity in their conduct. He went on to claim that a 
moral ascendency had been gained over the RAI over both land and sea.104 As with 
Malta, the air threat to the RN was quickly viewed as coming primarily, if not 
entirely, from the Germans.105 It was not only British perceptions of the RAI that 
rapidly diminished. As early as January 1941, the German Military Attaché in Rome 
wrote that “The Italian Air Force has not been able fully to execute the tasks allotted 
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to it; its air attacks have had only slight effect and reconnaissance is carried out only 
in a very incomplete manner.”106 Evidently, the perceived RAI threat was quickly and 
drastically revised downwards after the test of war. Such a view was accurate, as 
Santoni and Mattesini have demonstrated the overwhelming primacy of the Luftwaffe 
in comparison with the Italians in terms of effort and results in the air-sea conflict.107  
In November 1940, the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) made its famous strike on the 
RMI at Taranto. Three battleships sustained heavy damage, including one 
permanently disabled, and the fleet was relocated to ports further north. 
Unsurprisingly, this re-enforced perceptions of the RMI as unthreatening. 
Cunningham reported; 
 “Without indulging in speculation as to the political repercussions, it is already 
 evident that this successful attack has greatly increased our freedom of 
 movement in the Mediterranean and has thus strengthened out control of the 
 central area of the sea. It has enabled two battleships to be released for 
 operations elsewhere, while the effect on the morale of the Italians must be 
 considerable.” 
His assessment bought consensus. Churchill delighted the House of Commons when 
claiming it had decisively affected the balance of naval power across the globe; a 
claim he repeated to the War Cabinet and in his postwar writings. The Secretary of 
State for War – Anthony Eden - reported a devastating effect on the morale of the 
RMI.108  
Afterwards, Cunningham felt that the probability of the RMI concentrating to 
oppose a Malta supply run was at its most remote to date.109 Such confidence was not 
widely pervasive, however, and the RMI retained influence. This was demonstrated 
when Somerville, with the smaller Force H, was tasked with organising and protecting 
these supply runs from Gibraltar through the western basin. Three days after Taranto, 
he undertook Operation White, to fly 12 Hurricanes to Malta from a carrier. At sea, he 
unexpectedly received a signal telling him the RMI had sailed. Fearing interception 
by a superior RMI force looking to “balance their losses from Taranto”, he ordered 
the fly-off much earlier than planned and turned back for Gibraltar. Although he felt 
that they were still in range of Malta, the operation was a disaster - nine aircraft were 
lost.110 Within days Force H was at sea again for another resupply effort, Operation 
Collar. In light of the previous events Somerville requested an extra battleship to 
protect against a clearly still influential RMI. The two clashed at the Battle of Cape 
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Spartivento. In a manner highly reminiscent of Calabria, it was an indecisive long 
range affair from which the Italians withdrew first and Somerville opted not to 
pursue.111 After the battle, Somerville confided to his wife that he felt he had been 
“outmatched” by a superior Italian fleet.112 His perception was shared within the RN 
and Admiralty, who backed him fully during the brief board of enquiry into the 
engagement, which found no misconduct. This consistent pattern of perception 
continued into the New Year. When the next major convoy to Malta ran in January 
1941, Somerville again petitioned for greater capital ship reinforcements. 
Cunningham agreed sufficiently to send him two cruisers, as a battleship could not be 
spared.113 Although it sailed, the RMI failed to make contact, and the two fleets would 
not meet until the battle of Cape Matapan.  
In the aftermath of this engagement, a buoyant Churchill felt able to boast of 
“The tearing up of the paper fleet of Italy.”114 While the battle ensured the RMI didn’t 
interfere with evacuations from Greece and Crete, it didn’t achieve its primary tactical 
objective - sinking the battleship Vittorio Veneto. Instead it would return to duty by 
August, which led Cunningham to report the battle as a qualified success.115 The 
continued influence of the fleet-in-being affected not just tactical decisions, but also 
wider operational ones, and this was appreciated in the Admiralty immediately. 
Shortly after the battle, the DoP devised an estimate of projected Axis naval strength 
in March 1942, predicting that the RMI would have returned to an operational 
strength of three fully modern and two re-modernized battleships, along with 14 
cruisers of various types. This would necessitate a sizeable minimum RN commitment 
of three Queen Elizabeth class battleships, a carrier and 10 cruisers of mixed types, 
plus a large quantity of destroyers, in the eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, 
Gibraltar should house two battleships, a carrier, two cruisers and attendant 
destroyers.116 
This continued influence over spring and summer 1941 is well illustrated 
through two examples. First, Churchill had been continually demanding the basing of 
surface forces at Malta to increase interdiction on the Italian supply route to Libya. 
This was opposed by both Pound and Cunningham, who advocated only the sending 
of more submarines and aircraft. Pound went so far as to say, “The Italians had shown 
themselves ready to escort their convoys by surface forces far more powerful than 
anything we could afford to base at Malta. Our small group of cruisers and destroyers 
could only exert a deterrent effect.”117 Second, the question of sending a large convoy 
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through the Mediterranean carrying most of a British division to North Africa was 
brought up in the War Cabinet in August. Pound pointed to the increased activity of 
Italian capital ships, including the return of those damaged at Taranto and Matapan. 
He claimed this meant a large convoy would require the escort of “...three battleships, 
two carriers and some cruisers”. Ultimately it was decided that the dangers of routing 
this convoy through the Mediterranean did not justify the diversion of naval 
resources, and it was sent later by the Cape route.118 
Evidently, while both Taranto and Matapan represented important victories 
over the RMI, they had not removed the potential threat. It had to be managed and 
maintained, including the allocation of significant warships – while aircraft carriers 
might be used to oppose both air and sea attack, battleships and cruisers were almost 
exclusively for the latter. Major offensive operations that had been discussed and 
planned over 1941 had to be abandoned due to the continued existence of the RMI. 
Ambitious planning for an early invasion of Sicily was dropped in the autumn. It was 
deemed to be at a “now or never” state in late October, but quickly became a “never” 
because the RMI was still extant.119 A proposed raid on the port of Livorno met the 
same fate. Due to it involving sailing practically into the mouth of the Italian 
seaboard, it had been designed only to proceed if the RMI had been eliminated or it 
was felt that its morale had “cracked”. Evidently this was not perceived to be the case, 
as it was shelved indefinitely at the start of December.120 
Losses of key RN capital ships to German U-boats, increased German air 
power and renewed Italian activity late in the year also led to an escalation of British 
concerns. Cunningham expressed a reluctance to have his depleted capital ship force 
face the RMI. The Admiralty agreed, showing great consternation at the Italian 
superiority in battleships of 5:2, well below the minimum specified in April.121 When 
Italian Special Forces crippled the remaining two battleships in Alexandria, it forced 
the RN to allow any major RMI operations to go unopposed. After the Italians ran a 
major convoy to Libya in December (“M42”) under the cover of their entire fleet, 
Cunningham warned the Admiralty that “The enemy has experienced freedom of 
movement and must enjoy the taste...he will become more venturesome”. There is 
evidence of such increased confidence within the RMI in this period, and “M42” was 
followed by other “battleship convoys” in January.122 Meanwhile, the now depleted 
Force K was being ordered not intercept even the smaller enemy convoys due to 
increased Italian escort forces. Coupled with the entry of Japan to the war and 
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subsequent RN losses to them, the decision was taken for the British to keep the 
Mediterranean denuded of capital ships and instead attempt to control the sea with 
increased air power. The COS were clear that the RMI should become the primary 
target of any increased air component.123  
In spite of concerns over a lack of warships, a new Malta supply operation was 
desperately needed, and “MW10” sailed from Alexandria in March. To the concern of 
all, only a light escort was possible, which would be greatly outmatched by an RMI 
sortie in strength.124 The following engagement came to be known as the Second 
Battle of Sirte. The weak escort fought a defensive action making heavy use of 
smokescreens, and although several warships received heavy damage, the merchant 
ships were untouched when the Italian force disengaged that night. All were later sunk 
at sea or at Malta by air attack in a major blow to the island, but the naval engagement 
was viewed as a triumph over a superior Italian force. Churchill congratulated the 
commander of the escort force, Rear Admiral Vian, on having “routed and put to 
flight” one of the “most powerful battleships afloat”.125 Vian himself felt that the 
engagement had become “critical” at one stage and was very nearly a disaster. Yet 
when the report of the action was written three months later by a new C-in-C 
Mediterranean, Henry Harwood claimed that the Italians had been “driven off” in a 
“brilliant action”.126 The Admiralty press release was quick not only to praise Vian 
but also to demonize the RMI, mocking their failure to destroy the convoy in spite of 
clear superiority.127  
The seeming “success” of the naval side of MW10 and apparent failure of the 
RMI led to a brief alteration in perceptions. While Vian viewed the Italians warily and 
felt fortunate, many in the RN and Cabinet saw the engagement as proof that even a 
weak escort was sufficient to safeguard major convoys. When Operation Harpoon was 
undertaken in June, it was felt by the commander, Vice Admiral Curteis that “Judging 
from past encounters with the Italians, the convoy escort was large enough to deter 
them from doing any harm to the convoy”.128 Based on these perceptions, Curteis 
opted not to reinforce the light close escort (Force X) from his own force that 
included a battleship and two carriers, leaving Force X to face a roughly equal Italian 
force alone. It suffered heavy damage to multiple destroyers and its commander, 
Captain Hardy, felt compelled to scuttle one of them and two immobilised convoy 
ships, including a vital tanker. All but two merchant ships of the convoy were later 
sunk at sea by German aircraft, and it was Hardy’s appreciation that “But for the 
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enemy surface forces, these ships might have been brought in.”129 Simultaneously, 
Operation Vigorous sought to supply Malta with a convoy through the eastern basin. 
Lacking the heavy ships for escort, Harwood’s solution had been to attempt to use air 
power alone. It demonstrated to him the fallacy of trying to do so. He was later to 
admit that “Events proved with painful clarity that our striking forces had nothing like 
the weight required to stop a fast and powerful enemy force, and in no way 
compensated for our lack of heavy ships.”130 
Any complacency in British perceptions were short lived, and Operation 
Pedestal was assigned a huge escort. Three carriers, two battleships, seven cruisers 
and 24 destroyers were used to protect it against both the Luftwaffe and the RMI.131 
Even Churchill’s perceptions of the RMI had moved him to greater caution. During 
planning, he told the Cabinet that a decision had to be made whether or not to have 
two of the escorting battleships continue through to Malta, or turn them back at the 
last stage. Having them continue would expose them to greater air attack, but the 
alternative would expose the convoy to attack by superior RMI forces and likely 
heavy losses - a great change in demeanour. Pound was in agreement, feeling that as 
soon as the RMI learned that the heavier escorts had turned back, they would attack. 
His proposal was that everything possible should be done to weaken Italian capital 
ships and cruisers in advance through submarine and air attack.132 It was ultimately 
decided that they should turn back, but this discussion demonstrates that by August 
1942 the RMI was once again being perceived as a threat to major British operations, 
and influencing the planning of them. 
This effect persisted through the planning of the Anglo-American landings in 
Northwest Africa. In September, Pound told Harwood “...it will be essential to 
prevent or delay enemy reinforcements reaching Tunisia before we do. To this end 
operations will be necessary from Malta on the greatest scale possible”.133 Yet after 
the losses of the previous three major convoys, all three RN submarine flotillas in the 
Mediterranean were re-tasked to patrol in a defensive posture against potential RMI 
sorties.134 Even after the successful landings had taken place, and with US forces now 
available in the theatre, Cunningham urged caution:  
 “As long as the Italian fleet is in being and in a position to interfere a 
 considerable force of capital ships and therefore cruisers is required...the 
 Italian fleet will be a constant nuisance and menace to through convoys in the 
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 Mediterranean and it must be  our object to render it ineffective as soon as 
 possible.” 
He maintained this standpoint for the rest of the year, and was quick to counter 
opposing views, ensuring strong escort was given.135 
RMI influence extended to the planning for the invasion of Sicily (Operation 
Husky). The question of landing points was heavily debated, with much support for 
simultaneous landings at either end of the island. During the early planning, the Joint 
Planning Staff had noted that prior action would need to be taken to force the RMI up 
into Adriatic. That way a single powerful British battleship covering force could keep 
them bottled up there. Otherwise, it would present a much greater threat operating 
from ports on the northwest coast and would require a second American battleship 
covering force. If this was not available, they would have to limit the landings to a 
single end of Sicily, as they could not prevent the Italians from using the Straits of 
Messina. The RMI was also re-designated as a primary target for air attack, in order to 
immobilise it or force it to take refuge in the Adriatic.136 Ultimately this was not 
achieved, and was one of several factors ensuring the allies were consigned to a 
limited landing area. 
The orders for Husky recognised the potential threat of the RMI, especially 
now that their homeland was at stake: “It must, however, be recognised that if it is 
ever going to fight, it must fight now in defence of its country...and that it is 
strategically well placed to do so.”137 The idea was shared by RN commanders in 
theatre. Admiral Willis, of Force H, warned that the RMI was still a formidable fleet 
on paper. He strongly advised repeated air attacks against Italian battleships and 
heavy cruisers to incapacitate or sink them, and for strong dedicated submarine 
patrols and torpedo bomber forces if they put to sea.138 Just prior to Husky he issued 
tactical instructions noting “The importance of hitting the enemy before he hits us 
cannot be over-stressed, especially with regards to the Italians.” It reiterated the need 
to engineer a favourable engagement using submarines, air power and the cover of 
night in order to limit the RMI's capacity to inflict damage.139 In the final stages of 
planning the naval side of the Sicilian landings, Cunningham feared that “If they 
should ever slip through the Allies’ cordon, and get mixed up in a convoy, they could 
be a jolly nuisance.”140 It was only after the successful launching of the operation that 
perceptions definitively shifted. The RMI had not acted in any significant way to 
27 
 
defend Italian soil, while the deposition of Mussolini and the first secret Italian peace 
feelers all helped cement this. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Assessing how Britain viewed the armed forces of their enemies and potential 
enemies is vital for understanding their approach to imperial defence, grand strategy 
and military operations. The key opponent in the Mediterranean prior to and during 
the Second World War was the RMI, and yet British perceptions of it have not been 
fully interrogated until now. This article has demonstrated that there was in fact a 
remarkable degree of consistency in these perceptions from 1935-43 across key 
departments and personalities. It was always seen as greatly inferior to the RN, due to 
a combination of British intelligence, observation and experience of war with more 
deep-seated views. The British widely believed the RN was the world's premier naval 
power, and that the RMI had proven itself as both inferior and reticent to act over 
1915-18 and were “…probably little better fighters than they used to be”. This fits in 
with commonplace wider views of Italian military inferiority, which were often 
couched in highly xenophobic terminology - these were the people that Alexander 
Cadogan once derided as “the ice cream vendors”.141 Yet in spite of this, the RMI 
always retained the potential to cause damage and loss to an overstretched RN that 
had commitments on a global scale. It thus exercised influence on British actions, 
both strategically and operationally.  
Both the Abyssinian Crisis and the following pre-war period were 
characterised by the dilemmas of wider imperial defence. Any war with Italy would 
be won, and probably won with relative ease, but it would weaken Britain's ability to 
defend both the Mediterranean and its interests closer to home and in the Far East 
against aggression elsewhere by Germany or Japan. The greatest danger was damage 
to the overstretched RN, which was essential to providing security for the vital sea 
lines that linked the scattered imperial territories. This is why most of the period from 
1936-40 British policy towards Italy was underpinned by appeasement. The concern 
was not over a war against Italy, so much as one in which they combined with 
Germany, or which Japan took advantage of to make their own attack on British 
possessions in the Far East. Worst of all would be war with all three. Even a war 
against Italy alone could present problems in British imperial defence as any losses 
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sustained would hamper their ability to fight either of the other powers in the future, 
before rearmament could catch up. Thus a victory over the RMI could still be 
damaging to Britain. If an unpredictable Mussolini was to commit a “mad dog” act he 
might, as Chatfield so succinctly summarised, “…say ‘Go to sea and do not return 
until you have damaged the British Fleet’”.142 As such, audacious offensive plans like 
Churchill’s “Mediterranean First” strategy or a knockout blow against Italy had to be 
consigned to the dustbin of history.  
This is broadly the same manner in which the RMI was perceived in wartime. 
The only real difference was that in the pre-war period, the greatest threats to British 
Mediterranean control were deemed to come from the RAI and submarine fleet. Once 
war was underway, the fallacies of these perceptions were exposed, and Italian air and 
sub-surface power were quickly viewed as being of little consequence, being replaced 
instead by concerns over German U-boats and aircraft. The RMI was still very much 
viewed as inferior to the RN (and as a much lesser threat than German air power), but 
perceptions of it, whether within the cabinet, the Admiralty or the RN, stayed broadly 
consistent with the pre-war period.143 It was seen as a significantly sized force of 
moderate technical quality that was poorly handled by inferior personnel. It retained 
the ability to do notable damage to the RN, especially if it could engage in favourable 
conditions, which were often presented (although almost never taken) thanks to the 
success of German air power in sinking RN vessels over 1941-42, or losses and 
demands from other theatres. This would hamper Britain's ability to simultaneously 
combat Germany, especially with France out of the war. This view was to become 
further entrenched when Japan entered the war, and the nightmare scenario became a 
reality with immediate losses to RN Capital ships in the Far East. Elimination of the 
RMI was thus seen as a high priority when the resources were available. 
These perceptions endured despite key defeats that were inflicted on the RMI 
at Taranto and Cape Matapan, and its repeated failure to interrupt the Malta supply 
convoys. The continued existence of the fleet-in-being meant the British felt forced to 
allocate further warships in spite of the urgent need for them in other theatres. 
Operations and tactical instructions were modified based on the RMI's continued 
existence, while some of the more adventurous were cancelled entirely because of it. 
This influence persisted right up to the invasion of Sicily. On the few occasions that 
they did briefly alter, they quickly returned to the status quo. Understanding British 
perceptions is thus vital to comprehending not only their operations in the 
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Mediterranean, but also their grand strategy in the war. Far from being seen as a 
“huge joke”, the RMI maintained this influence consistently over 1935-43. 
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